

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 June 2005

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Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 3 May 2005 at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil)
later: Mr. Trezza (Italy)
later: Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (continued)

1. **Mr. Al-Shamsi** (United Arab Emirates), after endorsing the statement made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2005/SR.2), said that, despite massive and persistent efforts by the United Nations, several nuclear-weapon States were still developing both reactors and military arsenals, while many non-nuclear-weapon States were endeavouring to produce a nuclear weapon. His country's concerns were no longer limited to the arms race but reflected other dangers such as the attempts at trafficking in fissionable and other dangerous materials for the production of nuclear weapons by non-State actors — attempts which had heightened the risk of access by terrorist groups and posed a grave threat to regional and international security and stability.

2. The United Arab Emirates, which had acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) out of a firm belief in the importance of the universality of such treaties, was concerned about the distinction between the nuclear States' commitment to reducing and eliminating their nuclear weapons and the right of non-nuclear States to unconditional security assurances. That distinction had created a diplomatic impasse both at Review Conferences and in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, while also affecting the credibility and universality of the NPT. He therefore called on the current Conference to reach consensus on a common international nuclear disarmament strategy binding on all States and based on international law and the United Nations Charter, resolutions, multilateral agreements and protocols, all of which called for the system of non-proliferation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be strengthened. It was essential: to urge nuclear States to start negotiations leading to the full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Conference and the total destruction of nuclear and strategic weapons within a specific time frame; to urge the Conference on Disarmament to establish specialized international mechanisms to monitor the destruction of nuclear weapons, including an international agency responsible for negotiating a non-discriminatory multilateral treaty prohibiting the production of

fissionable material for the purposes of manufacturing nuclear weapons; to step up international efforts to develop an effective international instrument requiring nuclear States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear States; to demand that non-nuclear-weapon States seeking possession of such weapons review their policies and seek to resolve disputes by peaceful means; to enhance the international verification system and implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste, with a view to promoting transparency, objectivity and equality among States; and to reaffirm the alienable right of States parties to conduct research and produce nuclear power for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

3. While commending efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in many parts of the world, he condemned Israel's position regarding the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, particularly its insistence on keeping its nuclear reactors and military arsenal beyond the scrutiny of international inspectors in order to ensure its military superiority and continue its illegitimate occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories, in defiance of international law and resolutions. He urged States parties to take effective measures to compel Israel to eliminate its nuclear weapons and accede unconditionally to the NPT. Israel must also subject its nuclear, military and civil facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision and safeguards in accordance with international resolutions and the resolution adopted at the 2000 Conference. Lastly, he called for scientific and technological assistance to Israel to be discontinued, as it was being used to develop nuclear facilities and threatened the Middle East peace process. He hoped that the current Conference would result in a renewed commitment by States to the NPT and would strengthen the United Nations role in that context, with a view to establishing a comprehensive multilateral approach towards disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons.

4. **Mr. Udedibia** (Nigeria) said that, as a demonstration of its commitment to the NPT and its belief in a nuclear-free world, Nigeria had not only renounced the nuclear option, but also concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and ratified the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). On the 35th anniversary of the NPT, nuclear weapons still posed a serious threat to humanity. While

the global stockpile was significantly smaller today than it had been at the height of the Cold War, it was nonetheless estimated to contain over 2,000 times the firepower experienced in the entire Second World War and, if unleashed, would still be capable of totally annihilating human civilization. Given that the NPT was the only legally binding international agreement committing nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament, he urged States parties to reaffirm their commitment to fully implement all its aspects, in particular article VI. Achieving universality was also a matter of urgency. The need to confront the nuclear weapon threat was particularly relevant with the upcoming review of the Millennium Declaration, in which world leaders had resolved to strive for the elimination of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, and keep all options open for achieving that aim, including an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

5. Pending total elimination, it was imperative to agree on a legally binding instrument whereby nuclear-weapon States undertook not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The International Court of Justice had reinforced that principle in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Nigeria supported that opinion and firmly believed that nuclear non-proliferation could be sustained only if non-nuclear-weapon States that had renounced the development or possession of such weapons were given such assurances in a single, legally binding agreement. Nigeria therefore called on the current Conference to establish a subsidiary body on negative security assurances. That said, his delegation remained convinced that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use thereof.

6. Nigeria reiterated its support for the Final Document of the 2000 Conference, in particular the 13 practical steps contained therein, the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Conference. His delegation was gravely concerned about the emergence of new strategic doctrines in some nuclear-weapon States and firmly believed that the current Conference offered States a unique opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the 13 practical steps and the NPT as a whole. As a demonstration of its support for the total elimination of

nuclear testing, in 2001 Nigeria had ratified the CTBT. He stressed the importance of accession by all nuclear-weapon States to the CTBT and urged those States whose ratification was needed for it to enter into force urgently to take the necessary steps. Until such time, the States concerned should maintain their moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions. While acknowledging the importance of bilateral efforts by the two major nuclear Powers to set in motion the process of reducing strategic offensive nuclear weapons, his delegation shared the view of the vast majority of Member States that such reductions were not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. Such efforts must also be transparent and verifiable. He underscored the need for negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. To be meaningful, such a treaty should contain a reliable verification mechanism that did not exclude existing stockpiles. The current Conference should call on the Conference on Disarmament to begin substantive work on the issues before it as soon as possible, including negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. He reiterated Nigeria's full support for the proposal by the representatives of Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia and Sweden (the so-called five Ambassadors' proposal) as a mechanism for breaking the impasse in agreeing on a work programme for the Conference on Disarmament.

7. It was regrettable that recent efforts by some States to apply the objectives of non-proliferation to the use of civilian nuclear reactors might hinder the peaceful application of nuclear technology. In that regard, he urged the Conference to adopt appropriate measures to preserve the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. That said, all States parties needed to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards in order to build confidence in that respect. His Government had established an agency to regulate all nuclear-related activities in the country, in accordance with the NPT and the IAEA Statute. Nigeria would continue to support efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States concerned. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the decision by the five Central Asian States to sign the

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible, as well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, but affirmed the need to establish a similar zone in the Middle East and achieve the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on that region. The establishment of various nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world was a positive step, and the recent Conference of States Parties to Treaties that Establish Such Zones, held in Mexico, had again demonstrated the resolve of the States concerned to further advance the objectives of non-proliferation. Nigeria had actively participated in that Conference and believed that its Declaration would be valuable to the current Conference. While the States parties shared a common desire to achieve all three pillars — nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — caution and transparency was needed to ensure that no pillar was achieved at the expense of another.

8. Mr. Zhang Yan (China) said that, while there had been some encouraging developments since the 2000 Conference, the increase in non-traditional threats posed new challenges for international security. China's concerns centred on the increasing prominence of terrorism and WMD proliferation; the emergence of regional nuclear issues; the discovery of a nuclear smuggling network; the repudiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the danger of the weaponization of outer space; the reduced prospects of the CTBT entering into force; the international arms control and disarmament stalemate; the current deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament; and the insistence of certain States on maintaining a cold-war mentality, pursuing unilateralism, advocating preemptive action, listing other States as nuclear targets, lowering the nuclear threshold, and researching and developing new types of nuclear weapons. The current Conference was crucial, as the international community was expecting States parties to reach consensus on meeting new challenges, promoting multilateral arms control and non-proliferation, maintaining international peace and security, and promoting prosperity and development. Despite challenges to the non-proliferation regime, global security and arms control, the NPT was still the cornerstone of that regime, a decisive factor for world peace and stability, and a successful multilateral model. The international community must respond to recent developments and take urgent steps to strengthen the universality, effectiveness and authority

of the NPT. To that end, all three pillars must be promoted equally.

9. China had always advocated the total elimination of nuclear weapons and exercised the utmost restraint regarding their development. Moreover, it had never taken part in a nuclear arms race, supporting instead a nuclear disarmament process based on the preservation of global strategic security and undiminished security for all. The two major nuclear-weapon States should further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner, as a step towards total nuclear disarmament. The CTBT, which China was working to ratify and which it hoped all States would accede to at an early date, was a significant step in that process; pending its entry into force, the States concerned should observe the moratorium on nuclear testing. Agreement was also needed on a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament, so that it could commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, establish ad hoc committees and start substantive work on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and the non-weaponization of outer space. His delegation hoped that the current Conference would help break the deadlock.

10. It was more than justified for non-nuclear-weapon States to demand legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. From the moment it had possessed nuclear weapons, China had solemnly declared that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons and had later undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It had consistently urged other nuclear-weapon States to do the same. China had signed all the relevant protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties that were open for signature and had reached agreement with the ASEAN countries on the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its protocol, while also supporting the efforts by Middle Eastern and Central Asian States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones.

11. China opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons and urged States outside the NPT to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. It favoured efforts to improve the existing regime in line with new developments, believing that both symptoms and causes needed to be addressed. States should therefore respect each other's security interests; seek to build relationships based on mutual trust and benefits, equality and cooperation, thereby removing many of

the motivations for nuclear proliferation; address proliferation through dialogue and cooperation, not confrontation and exertion of pressure; reject unilateralism and double standards; and strengthen the existing regime, applying the principles of multilateralism and participation to ensure that it remained fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory and stepping up the role of the United Nations and other international organizations.

12. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery did not benefit world peace and stability or China's own security. China had therefore taken a number of key steps in that area, such as, publishing a white paper on non-proliferation policies and measures in 2003; establishing an export control system in line with international practice; improving regulations and legislation, by applying the catch-all principle and making acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards a condition for nuclear exports; and publicizing relevant policies and regulations to ensure effective implementation. China also participated in international non-proliferation efforts, such as, joining, in 2004, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thereby participating in all international treaties and multilateral mechanisms on nuclear non-proliferation; completing the necessary domestic procedures for entry into force of the Additional Protocol (the first nuclear-weapon State to do so); actively participating in the development and improvement of multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regimes; participating in consultations to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; actively engaging in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on non-proliferation; and implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

13. China also participated in international efforts to resolve proliferation issues peacefully. It would continue to work towards resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through the six-party talks and maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. It hoped that the parties would refrain from provocative action and demonstrate more flexibility in order to create favourable conditions for a resumption of talks. China favoured resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, meanwhile, within the IAEA framework and supported efforts by Iran and the United Kingdom, France and Germany to negotiate a long-term solution.

14. Safeguarding the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was key to promoting the

universality, effectiveness and authority of the NPT. Non-proliferation efforts should not therefore undermine the legitimate rights of States, though the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful to non-peaceful uses should, of course, be prevented. In order to enhance activities relating to peaceful uses, the international community should contribute more funds and technology and help IAEA to play a more important role in that regard. The development of nuclear energy was a key component of China's economic strategy. Guided by an approach based on people-oriented, balanced, harmonious and sustainable development, China was boosting the use of nuclear energy and technology, optimizing the energy structure, improving the environment, and promoting economic development and technological progress.

15. China attached great importance to cooperating with IAEA on nuclear safety and would intensify cooperation on information exchange and training. It supported the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and had played an active role in drafting the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which it was taking steps to join. China had always supported international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and attached particular importance to the IAEA role in that regard. Since joining IAEA in 1984, China had paid its contribution to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time, contributing an extra US\$ 1 million in 2004 in support of related projects in developing countries. It had also signed cooperation agreements on peaceful uses of nuclear energy with almost 20 States and was engaged in various forms of cooperation. The National People's Congress had just approved China's accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, further demonstrating China's firm commitment to promoting multilateral arms control and world peace and prosperity.

16. In view of the upcoming sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, his delegation firmly believed in the need further to strengthen the collective security framework and the joint promotion of peace, stability and cooperation. The complete destruction of nuclear weapons was the international community's common aspiration and an ultimate goal of the NPT. It was the responsibility of all States parties to seize the current

opportunity to promote the universality, effectiveness and authority of the NPT, reinvigorate international arms control and disarmament, and promote world peace and security. His delegation would work with all other delegations to ensure a successful outcome of the Conference.

17. *Mr. Trezza (Italy), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

18. *Mr. Fathalla (Egypt)* said that an objective evaluation of the current status of the Treaty revealed that inadequate progress had been made by nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their obligations. Furthermore, Egypt was concerned about the increased emphasis placed by some States and alliances on nuclear weapons, including their development to render them more usable in actual military operations. There was also a lack of compliance with recent commitments, such as the absence of a verification component from proposals for a fissile material cut-off treaty.

19. Non-compliance was one of the primary challenges to the Treaty; it must be addressed in an uncompromising, just and impartial manner. The degree of overall compliance by all States must be objectively assessed. The Conference must review the policies and doctrines of some military alliances, such as "military-sharing", to determine whether they conformed with States' obligations under the Treaty.

20. As legal obligations to be fulfilled by non-nuclear-weapon States, comprehensive safeguard agreements were the core of one pillar of the Treaty. When considering the safeguards issue, including the Model Additional Protocol, it was essential to ask whether lax implementation of disarmament obligations could logically be rewarded by the imposition of obligations under the other pillars, including the safeguards regime. To do so would lead to the false belief that a structural imbalance between the three pillars was being redressed. Furthermore, to condone cooperation between some States while calling for restrictions to the rights of others would undermine the stated goal of universality. Implementation of the 13 practical steps should be the foremost criterion in reviewing progress in implementing the Treaty as well as the determining factor with regard to acceptance by States parties of further obligations thereunder.

21. A common commitment was needed to facilitate, rather than restricting, the implementation

of article IV. Any attempt to restrict the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy raised fundamental questions concerning possible interpretation of the Treaty without resorting to the articles relating to its amendment.

22. In 1995 and 2000, special attention had been paid to the Middle East and the negative impact on the Treaty's credibility caused by Israel's remaining outside it. It was important for Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as a step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In addition, Egypt supported the establishment of a subsidiary body to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, thus contributing to the Treaty's universality.

23. *Mr. Drago (Italy)* said that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament represented one pillar of the Treaty. Clandestine nuclear activities by States parties and the development of nuclear military capability by non-parties weakened the Treaty and were detrimental to disarmament. Nuclear proliferation was also an obstacle to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, another pillar of the Treaty. Challenges to the non-proliferation regime and the increasing use of nuclear energy might call for the development of new regulations on the nuclear fuel cycle. Furthermore, the withdrawal of one country and the inconclusive results of the past preparatory process demonstrated an institutional weakness in the Treaty.

24. The main objectives of the Conference should be the review of the Treaty's operation during the past five years, the decisions and resolutions adopted in 1995 and the Final Document of the Conference held in 2000 (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)). In addition, those participating in the current meeting should be ambitious and try to outline consensual guidelines for the period to come, with the aim of strengthening the Treaty. Priority should be given, *inter alia*, to: negotiated solutions to all specific emerging or persistent nuclear proliferation problems in East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, which Italy was ready to support on a national basis; preventing access to nuclear weapons by terrorist groups; and the negotiation of a fissile materials cut-off treaty.

25. *Mr. Minty (South Africa)* said that the continued vitality and effectiveness of the Treaty depended on the implementation of the Treaty regime as a whole. The

Conference should guard against the continual reopening of the debate on obligations, commitments and undertakings, which might provide the legal foundation for others to reinterpret, negate or withdraw from other parts of bargains previously struck. The Conference should also guard against adopting measures to restrict the right to the verifiable use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The imposition of measures on certain States, but not on others exacerbated the inherent inequalities in the Treaty.

26. The only guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons was their complete elimination and the assurance that they would never be used again. The implementation of the 13 practical steps should thus be accelerated, and in that connection South Africa strongly supported the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament to give focused attention to the issue.

27. Nuclear weapons did not guarantee security; they distracted from it. They were illegitimate, irrespective of who possessed them. The illicit nuclear technology network had presented a serious challenge to the Treaty, and it was therefore important to review and improve controls designed to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technologies. South Africa had for that reason been thoroughly and urgently investigating the contravention of its non-proliferation legislation and was currently prosecuting alleged law-breakers. Yet no regime, no matter how comprehensive, could guarantee against abuse. The success of such controls depended on effective information-sharing and cooperation among relevant parties. IAEA, if allowed, could play a central role in addressing the illicit trade.

28. South Africa was pleased that IAEA had so far found that Iran had not diverted its nuclear technology to military purposes. It welcomed the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004 (IAEA/INFCIRC/637) and held that there was no need for a confrontation. The matter could be resolved through dialogue and negotiations.

29. The absence of a nuclear infrastructure might be the reason why many countries had not concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. South Africa urged those States to fulfil that Treaty obligation without delay. It welcomed steps undertaken to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including the negotiation of the Additional Protocol, an instrument for building

confidence in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. When used peacefully in, for example, the health and agriculture sectors, nuclear energy could improve the livelihood of many people. South Africa therefore placed a high premium on the IAEA Technical Co-operation Servicing and Co-ordination programme and was concerned about the inability of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund (TCAF) to meet the needs of developing countries. In that connection, States parties were urged to pay their contributions to the Fund.

30. A holistic, rather than piecemeal, approach to implementing the Treaty was vital. His delegation wished to propose a set of interrelated measures for strengthening the Treaty in all its aspects which could serve as a blueprint for the work to be undertaken up to 2010. Those measures included: universal accession to the Treaty and the early entry into force of the CTBT; action to address the proliferation threat posed by non-State actors; further reinforcement of IAEA safeguards; confidence-building by States with nuclear-weapon capabilities; full compliance by States with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, coupled with their pledges to refrain from any action that could trigger a new nuclear arms race; accelerated implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference; the reduction of non-strategic nuclear arsenals by nuclear-weapon States; and a halt to the development of new types of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies. Other steps would include the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification; the resumption of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material treaty, taking into account both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament; adherence to the principles of irreversibility and transparency in all nuclear disarmament measures and further development of adequate and efficient verification capabilities; and the negotiation of legally binding security assurances to be given by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

31. After the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, millions of South Africans had campaigned for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The national liberation movement in South Africa had opposed the development of bombs by the former apartheid Government. It had supported the call of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for nuclear disarmament, and for rechanneling resources from nuclear-weapons programmes into poverty reduction. The Government that had replaced the apartheid regime had voluntarily decided to dismantle its nuclear-weapons arsenal in the hope that its example would be emulated. South Africa remained deeply concerned at the continued retention of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of security doctrines that envisaged their use. Non-nuclear-weapon States had the right to internationally legally binding security assurances under the NPT in line with the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the preparatory process for the Review Conference. Those security assurances should be considered by a subsidiary body in Main Committee I of the Conference.

32. **Ms. Al-Mulla (Kuwait)** stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of the Treaty and giving equal consideration to its three pillars. An integral approach should be taken to consideration of the various issues before the Main Committees of the Conference, including regional matters, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. She appealed to the Conference to review the Treaty without compromising the rights of States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV while at the same time ensuring that those rights were not abused. In the current delicate situation, both the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the legitimate right to self-defence were not absolute but rather must be subject to controls. The Conference must not be dragged into imposing new commitments without carefully looking at a number of thorny issues that required discussion and appropriate solutions. A balance between verification of States' commitments and rights under the Treaty and the need to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament must be maintained at all costs.

33. Her delegation attached special importance to the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. There would be no security or stability in the Middle East as long as Israel refused to subject its nuclear facilities to the IAEA

safeguards system and impeded universal accession to the Treaty. The Conference must not turn a blind eye or be lenient towards a State that refused to allow verification of its facilities and had not yet acceded to the Treaty, impeding the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Such an unnatural situation would only encourage other States to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

34. Her delegation deeply regretted the failure to convene a special forum to discuss experiences in other nuclear-weapon-free zones because it had not been possible to agree on an agenda. Such a forum would have enabled the Middle East region to take a first step towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Her delegation welcomed the outcome of the Mexico Conference and stressed the vital role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving international and regional peace and security.

35. The current Review Conference provided an opportunity for those States that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT and achieve its universality. She also called for universality of the IAEA safeguard system, and its recognition as a verification standard, in order to foster and strengthen the NPT.

36. There was clearly a need for a system of protection against smuggling and illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Deeply concerned over such abuse, her delegation looked forward to the forthcoming discussions on amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to include a clause on nuclear terrorism. Kuwait had recently acceded to that Convention. Initiatives by States in the field of nuclear security should not be viewed as separate tools but rather as complementary with a view to strengthening both the NPT and the IAEA mandate. She called for transparent export controls and welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In conclusion, her delegation agreed with the Director-General of IAEA on the linkage between development and security and supported his proposals for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

37. *Mr. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil), President, resumed the Chair.*

38. **Mr. Cerar (Slovenia)** said that, riding on the momentum generated by the high-level meeting of heads of States and Governments, held in September

2004, the Review Conference should adopt bold decisions on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all" (A/59/2005). He called for universal accession to the Treaty and urged those States that had not already signed and ratified it to do so as non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation was strongly in favour of preserving the balance between the three major pillars of the Treaty — non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Concerned at the risk of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, his delegation fully embraced the Security Council's view that terrorism constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security. In that connection, it welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which filled a gap in existing multilateral non-proliferation and control regimes. He called on those States which had not yet done so to submit their national reports under that resolution as soon as possible. Slovenia stood ready to provide assistance to countries that lacked the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience or resources necessary to that end.

39. Slovenia, which possessed nuclear facilities and thoroughly fulfilled its international non-proliferation obligations, attached great importance to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under article IV of the Treaty. Such activities, however, must be transparent and placed under IAEA scrutiny. In 2000, Slovenia had concluded an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguard agreement. It urged other States to do likewise. IAEA should continue to assist States in preparing model legislation, as the lack of domestic legislation in certain States parties posed a real threat to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. His delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal spelled out in his report, on enhancing the role of IAEA in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, including as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. It urged all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT, particularly those listed in Annex 2 of that Treaty. Further delay in that Treaty's entry into force would not only constitute a permanent nuclear threat to the human race but could also undermine global and regional achievements in arms control and non-proliferation. Slovenia's new and stricter legislation on export controls for dual-use items, introduced in 2000, had been further amended

the previous year. To that end, Slovenia also applied the European Union Council regulation 1343/04, had begun cooperating with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to strengthen international control over its nuclear reactors and capabilities and was a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) and Zangger Committee.

40. Slovenia, which complied with all its obligations under article VI of the NPT, urged all nuclear weapon States to continue their efforts in that regard. In its view, the 13 practical steps outlined in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference remained valid. His delegation welcomed efforts by nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, particularly by ratifying the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty concluded in Moscow in 2002.

41. He expressed strong support for the European Union position concerning withdrawal from the NPT. The Conference should adopt appropriate measures to discourage States parties from withdrawing and the Security Council should play a greater role in addressing violations of Treaty obligations. In conclusion, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which it intended to sign as soon as the Convention was open for signature in September. It called on all States to do likewise.

42. **Mr. Hannesson** (Iceland) said that, the previous month his delegation had expressed its support for the Secretary-General's proposals on strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation structures. Iceland had long believed that credible and effective verification was a key component of the NPT regime. In order to prevent violations, action must be taken to strengthen NPT compliance and verification mechanisms, as well as the role of IAEA.

43. His delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its nuclear weapons policies and comply with its non-proliferation and disarmament obligations under the Treaty. It also hoped that the Islamic Republic of Iran would comply with IAEA requirements for transparency in the development of its nuclear programme. Stressing the importance of the universality of the NPT, he urged all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States without delay. Strong measures were needed to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty.

44. In conclusion, his delegation reiterated its support for the Proliferation Security Initiative to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and for Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), which addressed concerns about the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

45. Ms. Vášáryová (Slovakia) said that, in his recent address to the Conference on Disarmament, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, had stressed the need for balanced implementation of the NPT through the harmonization of non-proliferation measures on the basis of the Treaty's three pillars. Her delegation would be working to preserve the relevance of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, focusing, in particular, on the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations and accountability would be necessary to ensure that nuclear technologies and material were not misused or did not fall into the hands of terrorists. The IAEA safeguards system was an essential tool for building the necessary confidence to ensure the effectiveness of the multilateral system. Her delegation believed that the conclusion of additional protocols should be developed into a verification standard and appealed for universal submission to the IAEA safeguards system.

46. Furthermore, the early entry into force of the CTBT, with its comprehensive verification regime, would be an opportunity to reinforce the non-proliferation system. An early start to negotiations on a global treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices would represent another contribution to the process, and the members of the Conference on Disarmament could do much in that respect. Export controls, as well, ranked among the effective tools for ensuring non-proliferation. Certainly, the recently revealed black market in nuclear materials confirmed the need for better controls.

47. It was crucial to recognize that non-proliferation obligations were not temporary bargaining tools for obtaining nuclear technologies and materials, in view of the fact that, regrettably, some States parties' intentions differed from those of article IV of the Treaty. A global safeguards and verification system meant that all countries respected all obligations and unconditionally implemented Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) while allowing the IAEA, through an additional protocol, to confirm that no undeclared nuclear activities were going on within

their territories. States parties had a unique opportunity and a heavy responsibility: the future of non-proliferation would look exactly as the Review Conference shaped it now.

48. Mr. Jankauskas (Lithuania) observed that during the past five years the NPT regime had been challenged by the withdrawal of a State party, clandestine nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism, all of which required a response from the Review Conference. The right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes must not be used as a pretext for violating the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Indeed, the use by States of that right called for stronger means of verification by the IAEA. The conclusion of an IAEA additional protocol should become a universal verification standard and a condition of supply to all non-nuclear-weapon States. Lithuania was ready to share its four-year experience of implementing such a protocol. Moreover, States should not be able to withdraw from the Treaty and then continue to enjoy the benefits of nuclear technologies acquired under it.

49. Multilateral export-control regimes, supported by robust national systems, had become important tools in the implementation of article III of the Treaty and were also an integral part of an effective response to the danger that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists, especially in view of the increased black-market activity in sensitive nuclear technology and material. In that regard, serious, sustained efforts to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) were also crucial. The Proliferation Security Initiative and its interdiction principles must also be credited for marshalling the political will and the capability to prevent illegal transfers of nuclear material and equipment. The Conference must act quickly to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as another strategy to deny access to terrorists. The adoption the previous month of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was welcome.

50. At the end of 2004, Lithuania had shut down the first RBMK-type reactor at its Ignalina nuclear power plant and the second and last reactor was slated for shutdown by 2009 — an expensive and complicated procedure that would not have been possible without the help of European and other donors. During the decommissioning, and as a matter of practice, Lithuania gave priority to safety and security measures

to prevent any possible diversion of nuclear materials or equipment. It had received IAEA assistance in improving its national physical protection system and establishing a system for locating, securing and removing orphan sources.

51. Lithuania's national report on its implementation of the NPT had covered all the articles of the Treaty, and such comprehensive reporting by all States parties should become standard. The Review Conference should build upon the established principles of the past, and particularly upon the 13 practical steps. Priority should be given to the verifiable elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, in fulfilment of the 1991-1992 Presidential nuclear initiatives agreed to by the United States and the Russian Federation. By the close of the current Review Conference, the Treaty's integrity and political credibility should have been strengthened, and decisions taken aimed at overcoming the institutional deficit.

52. **Ms. Holguín Cuéllar** (Colombia) observed that nuclear proliferation was steadily increasing and proving to be a serious test of both the NPT and the broader non-proliferation system. The global situation was no less complex currently than in the 1960s when the Treaty had been conceived and adopted. Some nuclear States still remained outside the NPT and there were still global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. There had been a discouraging lack of progress under article VI since the previous Review Conference.

53. Colombia, a traditional advocate of total disarmament and a signatory of the CTBT, had helped negotiate the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to establish the Organization for the Proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL). Furthermore, Colombia would soon be concluding an additional protocol with the IAEA.

54. The acquisition of nuclear weapons or technology by terrorists must be prevented, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and controls should be imposed not only on horizontal proliferation but also on vertical proliferation, with sanctions applied in the case of the latter, under a strengthened NPT.

55. As one of the States involved in the five Ambassadors' proposal, Colombia had sought to revive negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and to convince the nuclear-weapon States to reconsider their

strategies so that a nuclear disarmament committee could be established. All States parties should work to prevent any country from joining the ranks of the nuclear-weapon States and should endorse the NPT in its entirety.

56. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyzstan) observed that admittedly the high expectations following the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences remained, at best, only partially fulfilled. Most of the 13 practical steps had not yet been taken, and there had even been some backsliding. The Conference on Disarmament remained stalled, the CTBT had not yet entered into force, the bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM treaty) had been repudiated, there was no visible progress in negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty, and, if anything, nuclear weapons held a more prominent place in the security policies of some nuclear-weapon States. The 2002 Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty) represented progress but did not adequately address the dangers of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The current Review Conference should discuss ways of accelerating the transparent and irreversible reduction of all categories of nuclear weapons.

57. A positive development in non-proliferation had been the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia. Such zones now covered nearly the whole of the southern hemisphere, in addition to the Antarctic, the seabed and outer space. Besides their expanded geographical coverage, they had also become stronger instruments of non-proliferation. His Government was pleased at the recent progress that had been made in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia: the treaty establishing such a zone had been drafted and would soon be signed by the five States involved, thus strengthening regional and global security.

58. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of efforts in that area, must be adapted to the new challenges, and its States parties must take account of the new realities. In view of the horrendous terrorist attacks on several continents since the previous Review Conference, all recognized the importance of preventing terrorist from possibly acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. Adequate safeguards and the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities remained the first line of defence. The IAEA

had commendably strengthened the international safeguards system, and his Government was pleased to report that it had entered into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 2004 and would soon be concluding an additional protocol. It also supported the ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in order to address the new proliferation challenges posed by non-State actors. Terrorists in particular should be prevented from gaining access to fissile material that could be used to fabricate dirty bombs. And the Review Conference should consider means of securing, and eventually reducing and eliminating, existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium in the civilian nuclear sector. Export controls should be reinforced, and illicit trafficking in sensitive nuclear materials should be combated. The adoption a month earlier by the General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, a Russian initiative, was a source of great satisfaction.

59. Attention should also be given to mitigating the environmental consequences of past and present nuclear-weapon programmes, and particularly of uranium stockpiles. Such environmental issues were often overlooked, although they had had a serious impact on his own and other countries. Governments and organizations with expertise in the area of clean-up and disposal should be ready to provide assistance in affected areas. It was also necessary to emphasize the vital but underutilized role that education and training could play as disarmament and non-proliferation tools, as highlighted in General Assembly resolution 59/62 and in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124), whose recommendations should be taken up by the Review Conference. Although the world was a very different place, the principles and objectives articulated 10 years earlier at that Review Conference remained as compelling as before.

60. **The President** said that he was continuing his intensive consultations with delegations and groups of delegations in an effort to bridge the outstanding differences on item 16 of the agenda.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.